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The Transnational Legal Ordering of the
Death Penalty
Stefanie Neumeier and Wayne Sandholtz
A transnational legal order (TLO) authoritatively shapes “the
understanding and practice of law” in a specific area of social activity,
involving both state and civil society actors, and linking national, regional,
and international levels. We argue that a TLO has emerged and settled
since 1945 around capital punishment. Our analysis of the death penalty
TLO treats “bottom-up” and “top-down” effects as interconnected,
addresses the creation of legal order at both national and international levels,
and emphasizes the recursivity linking developments at both levels. We trace
the development of death penalty abolition from its origins in the immediate
aftermath of World War II. Because the practical effects of abolition—in
shaping legal and penal practice—necessarily occur at the national level, the
analysis focuses on the international, transnational, and domestic factors
that lead states to end capital punishment. After describing the emergence of
a TLO abolishing the death penalty, we offer a new way of measuring the
global and country-specific activities of transnational advocacy groups
(Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International). We incorporate that
measure in an analysis of data from about 150 countries. The central
hypothesis is that making the TLO on capital punishment effective through
abolition in national law requires modes of political action that overcome
majoritarian public support for retention. We suggest two domestic
institutional features that make abolition more likely despite retentionist
popular opinion: proportional representation in the legislature and
independent courts. We also suggest that transnational non-governmental
organizations (NGO) and some regional organizations can support the
move to abolish. The data analysis is largely consistent with these
propositions and brief case studies illustrate the principal mechanisms.
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 125
I. Abolition: the Big Picture.......................................................................................... 127
Stefanie Neumeier is a PhD student at the University of Southern California, Political Science and
International Relations; Wayne Sandholtz is John A. McCone Chair in International Relations and
Professor of International Relations and Law, University of Southern California.

124

[2019]

LEGAL ORDERING OF THE DEATH PENALTY

125

II. Abolition and Legal Ordering: International ........................................................ 131
A. Global Ordering ........................................................................................... 132
B. Regional Ordering ........................................................................................ 134
C. Transnational Actors ................................................................................... 141
III. Data and analysis ..................................................................................................... 144
IV. Case studies .............................................................................................................. 150
A. Lithuania ........................................................................................................ 151
B. South Africa .................................................................................................. 152
C. Belarus ........................................................................................................... 154
D. Japan .............................................................................................................. 155
Conclusion....................................................................................................................... 157
Appendix ......................................................................................................................... 159
INTRODUCTION
A transnational legal order (TLO) has emerged since 1945 around capital
punishment. The TLO is clearly transnational: as of 2017, 105 countries had abolished
the death penalty for all crimes. A further eight countries had prohibited it for
ordinary crimes, and forty-six had abolished it de facto (by not carrying out any
executions for at least ten years).1 The death penalty TLO is also legal, at both the
national and international levels. In national law, the prohibition on the death
penalty can be written into the constitution itself, established by judicial
interpretation, or implemented via legislation. At the international level, core human
rights treaties do not prohibit the death penalty, but rather envision its “progressive
restriction.”2 And the death penalty is explicitly excluded as a punishment in the
international criminal tribunals established in the 1990s and since.3 Regional treaties,
including the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish
the Death Penalty, and especially Protocol No. 6 and Protocol No. 13 to the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), aim directly at its abolition.
Finally, the interconnected domestic, international, and regional legal rules related
to capital punishment constitute an order: they authoritatively shape “the
understanding and practice of law” in a specific area of social activity.4
The death penalty TLO differs from TLOs that have emerged in other areas
of criminal justice, in which the objective is to regulate criminal activity that crosses
borders. TLOs for money laundering, the financing of terrorism, human trafficking,
or drug smuggling, for example, fit that mold. But TLOs can also regulate activities
1 Data compiled by the authors.
2 ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 26 (5th
ed. 2015).
3 Including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court.
4 Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDERS 3, 5, 20 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015).
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that are essentially national or local, like prison conditions or the death penalty,
which is the focus of this Article. Addressing the punishment end of the criminal
justice spectrum, this study directly addresses several themes that are central to the
TLO framework, including normative settlement, concordance, institutionalization,
and recursivity.5 We seek to show that the death penalty TLO has attained partial
normative settling, uneven concordance, and patchy institutionalization. The
explanation for this set of mixed outcomes builds on the insight that distinct TLOs
are almost invariably interconnected. In the case of capital punishment, the key
linkage is to the broader international human rights regime. The consolidation of
international standards for criminal law, as well as the movement for death penalty
abolition, were shaped by the larger post-World War II human rights movement;
indeed, both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) delineate basic rights
of those subject to criminal proceedings. The cause of death penalty abolition
advanced under a banner of rights: the fundamental right to life and the right to be
free from cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment.
Our analysis of the death penalty TLO incorporates core features of the TLO
framework. It assesses the creation of legal order at both national and international
levels, and emphasizes the recursivity linking developments at both levels.6 We
directly confront several of the questions posed in the introduction. We return to
some of them more specifically in our conclusion, but the core of our argument is
that the death penalty TLO has attained partial settling, concordance, and
implementation in large part because the global human rights framing has been at
odds with domestic framings that see the death penalty not just as congruent with
local values, but as necessary to protect them. In fact, death penalty abolition at the
national level has generally occurred not in response to public demands, but despite
public support for retention. Calls for restoring the death penalty arise now, as they
have in the past, even in states that have long since abolished it. A key puzzle is
therefore how the death penalty TLO has been able to achieve substantial settling
and partial concordance in the face of general public opposition.
The story at the global and regional levels is relatively straightforward: treaties
limiting or abolishing the death penalty were agreed upon by political elites who
worked at one remove, at least, from mass political opinion. However, and
importantly, abolition of the death penalty has practical effect only at the domestic
level, which is also where the primary puzzle resides. The core of our analysis
therefore examines abolition in domestic law, where we confront the question of
how abolition can occur domestically when publics almost universally favor
retention. We argue that specific types of domestic institutions can make nonmajoritarian policy-making more likely, specifically: (1) legislatures with
proportional representation and (2) courts that are independent of the political

5 See id.
6 See id. at 3, 5.
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branches. These institutions make more likely, respectively, abolition through
legislation and abolition via judicial decision. We additionally hypothesize that
transnational influences can enhance the likelihood of abolition, in particular: (1)
the incentive of membership in regional organizations, and (2) the persuasive and
socializing influence of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs).
We offer a novel means of measuring INGO influence and incorporate it in the
analysis of data from about 150 countries.
The first two sections describe the death penalty TLO and the broad outlines
of its emergence at both national and international levels. The third section presents
our data and analysis of abolition in national law. A fourth section offers brief case
studies to illustrate the mechanisms highlighted by the broader analysis, including
instances of both abolishers and non-abolishers. In the conclusion, we return to the
broader questions posed by the overall project.
I. ABOLITION: THE BIG PICTURE
Punishment by death has existed since antiquity and is still seen in some parts
of the world as a natural, or even necessary, part of penal law. The death penalty
served simultaneously as a public spectacle, an exemplar of the wages of crime (or
of sin), and a tool of social control and repression.7 Enlightenment thinkers sought
to demolish the assumptions and myths that accumulated over the centuries
surrounding capital punishment.8 Cesare Beccaria argued that punishment, instead
of seeking to terrorize the populace into compliance with the laws, should be
proportionate to the nature of the offense. He contended that capital punishment
had no place in a modern society because it was inhumane and ineffective.9
The first laws to abolish capital punishment were enacted in U.S. states,
perhaps ironically, given the continued retention of the death penalty in the United
States. Pennsylvania in 1794 abolished it for all crimes except premeditated murder;
Michigan became the first state to abolish the death penalty for murder in 1846.10
A few countries banned capital punishment for peacetime offenses in the nineteenth
century and early twentieth century (though some would later reinstate it for periods
of time). These were clustered in Europe (Portugal, San Marino, the Netherlands,
Italy, Austria, Romania, and Switzerland) and Latin America (Venezuela, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, and Uruguay). The Latin American countries banned the death penalty
for all crimes, in peacetime and in war. The Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes
(excluding treason and certain wartime offenses) in the first decades of the twentieth
century.11 After World War II, a global movement to ban capital punishment
7 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 10.
8 See, e.g. Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishements, in ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER
WRITINGS 1, 52 (Aaron Thomas ed., Aaron Thomas & Jeremy Parzen trans., 2008).
9 See id.
10See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 12–13.
11See id. at 13.

128 UCI JRNL. OF INT’L, TRANSNATIONAL, & COMP. L. [Vol. 4:124]
developed, aiming to prohibit its use under both national and international law. As
Figure 1 shows, the majority of legislative acts abolishing the death penalty have
occurred since about 1950.
Figure 1

Source: Abolition year data from Hood and Hoyle (2015) and Amnesty
International Annual Reports
Of course, states can abolish capital punishment through various legal means:
by constitutional enactment or amendment, by judicial interpretation, and by
legislation. Abolition of the death penalty in constitutions has, like abolition overall,
taken off after World War II. Figure 2 displays the cumulative number of
constitutions that abolish the death penalty, based on data from the Comparative
Constitutions Project.12 Constitutions written after 1945 were framed in the era of
global human rights and were overwhelmingly shaped by the rights-based “new
constitutionalism.”

12 See Zachary Elkins et al., Characteristics of National Constitutions, Version 2.0 (2014),
http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org. Accessed 28 December 2016.
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Figure 2

As the preceding figures show, the momentum for abolition gathered after
World War II and peaked in the 1990s and in the first decade of the twenty-first
century (Table 1). Figure 3 depicts the global situation as of 2017. “De facto
abolition” refers to countries that retain capital punishment in the law but that have
not carried out an execution in the previous ten years. Some of those states have
announced moratoria on executions or an intention to halt them entirely.13

13 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2 at 75–147. Examples of de facto states which have announced
moratoria or intention to halt executions include Tunisia, Morroco, Algeria, Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana,
Papua New Guinea, Maldives, South Korea, etc.
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Table 1: Abolitions in law, by decade

Before 1950s
1950s
1960s
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000–2009
2010–2017

Abolished
for all
crimes

Abolished for
ordinary
crimes

Total

9
1
4
10
14
35
23
9

9
2
4
6
4
6
4
2

18
3
8
16
18
41
27
11

Total
105
37
142
Note: a number of states first abolished for ordinary crimes and later
for all crimes; the table counts both. The overall total is greater than the
sum of abolitionist countries as of 2017 because some states appear
twice, once in the column for all crimes and once in the column for
ordinary crimes.

Figure 3

Finally, the extent of abolition varies dramatically across regions. Figure 4
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depicts the regional picture as of 2017. Note that all Western European countries
have abolished the death penalty for all crimes, as have most post-Soviet states and
the countries of Oceania (Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Island states). In
contrast, abolition has made little headway in Asia and the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA), where more than half of states retain the death penalty.
Figure 4

II. ABOLITION AND LEGAL ORDERING: INTERNATIONAL
The construction of the death penalty TLO proceeded in parallel at the
domestic and international levels, with both processes drawing force from the
emerging global human rights movement. We begin with the international level
because the global development of human rights exercised a powerful influence on
the incorporation of human rights in domestic law, especially during the waves of
democratization that swept the globe from the 1980s to the early 2000s. For
instance, empirical research has clearly demonstrated the influence of international
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instruments like the UDHR and the core international human rights treaties on the
incorporation of human rights in national constitutions.14 The international
movement to build global human rights norms started even before World War II
ended, so we begin with a historical sketch of the transnational movement to end
capital punishment.
A. Global Ordering
Though a number of countries abolished capital punishment in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries,15 a genuine transnational drive to prohibit executions
began only after World War II. The campaign to abolish the death penalty was, in
large part, a reaction to the horrible excesses that had occurred during the war.
Fascist regimes had used widespread executions—judicial and extrajudicial—as a
tool of political repression. The Nazi Reich, for example, had issued “some 16,500
death sentences.”16 Thus, the “right to life” language that appeared in post-World
War II international human rights documents was aimed at the death penalty. The
drafting of those documents began shortly after peace was achieved. The U.N.
Economic and Social Council created the Commission on Human Rights in June
1946 and charged it with preparing an International Bill of Rights. Its drafting
committee produced the text of the UDHR, which was adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948.17 The UDHR declares in Article
3: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.”18 As Schabas
relates, in the discussions that accompanied the drafting of the UDHR, the right to
life provision triggered debate on two issues: abortion and the death penalty. Some
participants favored recognizing capital punishment as an exception to the right to
life, whereas others advocated an explicit ban on the death penalty. In the end, a
compromise emerged, in which the UDHR affirmed the right to life without
qualification and omitted any statement for or against the death penalty.19
The UDHR was a statement of common aspirations, but its authors were
simultaneously beginning work on a document that would take the form of a
binding convention, namely, the ICCPR. The UN Commission on Human Rights
14 See, e.g. David Sloss & Wayne Sandholtz, Universal Human Rights and Constitutional Change (2018);
Colin J. Beck et al., Constitutions in World Society: A New Measure of Human Rights (Feb. 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2906946; Mila Versteeg, Law versus Norms: The Impact of Human Rights Treaties
on National Bills of Rights, 171 J. OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECON. 87 (2015); Zachary
Elkins et al., Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, 54
HARVARD INT’L L. J. 61 (2013); David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global
Constitutionalism, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1163 (2011).
15 Data compiled by the authors.
16 RICHARD J. EVANS, RITUALS OF RETRIBUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN GERMANY 1600–1987,
at 795 (1996).
17 See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
25–39 (1997).
18 G.A. Res. 217 A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3 (Dec. 10, 1948).
19 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 25–
39 (2002).
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worked from 1947 to 1954 on drafting a covenant, the early versions of which
treated the death penalty as an exception to the right to life. The draft of the ICCPR
approved by the Commission on Human Rights in 1954 went before the General
Assembly, which turned it over to its Third Committee for continued refinement.
The provision that occupied the greatest share of the Third Committee’s time
concerned the right to life, particularly capital punishment.20 The Third Committee
reached agreement on what would become Article 6 of the ICCPR in 1957.21
During the debates in the Third Committee, Uruguay proposed a text that
would have prohibited the death penalty in absolute terms. Colombia, Finland,
Panama, Peru, and Ecuador spoke in favor. A number of other states endorsed
abolition in principle, but judged that its inclusion in the convention would be overly
ambitious and would make it difficult for some states to accept the treaty. France
proposed wording that would commit states only to move toward the abolition of
capital punishment, an idea that garnered substantial support. A number of states
opposed the French suggestion, though none offered an explicit defense of capital
punishment. The Committee eventually passed compromise language and entered
Article 6 as paragraphs 2 and 6.22 In the Third Committee, Article 6 passed with
fifty-five votes in favor, none opposed, and seventeen abstentions; that article
underwent no subsequent revision before the adoption of the Covenant by the
General Assembly in 1966.23 The relevant parts of Article 6 read as follows:
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of
death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with
the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not
contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty
can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a
competent court. . . .
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or
commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the
sentence of death may be granted in all cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons
below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant
women.
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the
abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to the present
Covenant.24

20 See id. at 45 46.
21 See id. at 44, 48.
22 See id. at 62 64.
23 See id. at 68 70, 80.
24 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Mar. 23, 1976, S. Exec. Doc. No. E, 95-
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In addition, Article 4 prohibits any derogation from Article 6, even in “time
of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.”25 Article 4 thus forbids
states from compromising the procedural safeguards that must accompany
imposition of the death penalty (Art. 6(2) and 6(4)) or the prohibition on applying
it to specific categories of persons (Art. 6(5)), even during the most critical national
emergencies. In other words, the ICCPR signaled that the direction of development
of human rights law was to the “progressive restriction” of capital punishment.26
In 1980, a set of Latin American and European countries introduced in the
General Assembly a draft Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.27 The Protocol
would both require abolition of the death penalty and prohibit its reintroduction by
any state that abolished it. The General Assembly passed a decision to continue
work on the proposal, though a number of states declared that they would have
voted against an actual protocol. Work continued over the subsequent years, and by
1989, the General Assembly had a draft before it. The Second Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of
the Death Penalty (Second Optional Protocol) passed in the General Assembly in
December 1989; fifty-nine states voted in favor, twenty-six against, and forty-eight
abstained.28 The key provisions appear in Article 1:
1. No one within the jurisdiction of a State Party to the present Protocol
shall be executed.
2. Each State Party shall take all necessary measures to abolish the death
penalty within its jurisdiction.
The Second Optional Protocol also prohibits any reservations except for those
that retain the death penalty for serious military crimes in wartime (Art. 2) and
renews the ICCPR’s ban on derogations (Art. 6). As of May 2018, eighty-five states
were parties to the Second Optional Protocol and another two had signed the
Protocol but had not ratified it.29
B. Regional Ordering
The international movement to end capital punishment also has a powerful
regional dimension. Regional bodies in Europe and Latin America began preparing
their own international human rights instruments in parallel with the United Nations
in the late 1940s. Regional organizations can create various incentives for states to
abolish the death penalty. The most powerful such incentive is almost certainly the
one implemented in Europe, where both the Council of Europe (COE) and the
2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
25 Id. art. 4.
26 HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2.
27 The sponsors were Austria, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy, Portugal, and Sweden.
28 See SCHABAS, supra note 17, at 168 175.
29 See Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at
the abolition of the death penalty, December 15, 1989, https://treaties.un.org/doc/
Treaties/1991/07/19910711%2007-32%20AM/Ch_IV_12p.pdf.
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European Union (EU) have actively promoted death penalty abolition. Hood goes
so far as to argue that, though multiple causes are responsible for the spread of
abolition, none is as “vital as the political influence and pressure exerted by
European political institutions.”30 Regional institutional incentives had an effect on
abolition, especially among the Central and Eastern European countries that
democratized after 1990.
Following the example of the United Nations, the Ninth International
Conference of American States (1948) envisioned a general declaration to be
followed by a more specific and binding convention. The resulting 1948 American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (ADRDM) thus included in Article 1
a statement that “every human being has the right to life,” but made no mention of
the death penalty. Respect for the right to life provision in Article 1 of the ADRDM
became obligatory with the 1967 amendments to the Charter of the Organization
of American States.31
A special Inter-American Conference in 1969 considered a draft American
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). Though several states favored an all-out
ban on capital punishment, the final text contained a number of restrictions on the
death penalty, without prohibiting it. The ACHR was signed in November 1969 and
entered into effect in July 1978. Fourteen out of nineteen national delegations issued
a declaration of their “firm hope of seeing the application of the death penalty
eradicated from the American environment” and called for an additional protocol,
which would finalize the unconditional abolition of the death penalty.32 The ACHR
follows the lead of the ICCPR in limiting the application of the death penalty and
pointing toward abolition, but it is more restrictive than the U.N. document. For
instance, under Article 4(2), the death penalty may “not be extended to crimes to
which it does not presently apply.”33 Furthermore, states that have abolished the
death penalty may not reinstate it (Art. 4(3)).34 The ACHR also expands the
categories of persons to whom the death penalty cannot be applied to include those
over seventy years of age (Art. 4(5)), and it prohibits capital punishment for
“political offenses” (Art. 4(4)).
In the mid-1980s, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, created
by the ACHR, became concerned with the extension of the death penalty to new
crimes in some states. At the urging of Uruguay, the Commission proposed in 1987
a protocol to the ACHR to ban the death penalty. Only four of the nineteen states
parties to the convention had retained capital punishment, and in June 1990, the
Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly approved the optional

30ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 16 (3d ed. 2002).
31 See SCHABAS, supra note 19, at 312–15.
32 See id. at 326 32.
33 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (Dept. of Int. Legal Affairs 2006 ed.).
34 See id.
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protocol (ACHR Protocol).35 Whereas the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR
requires states to take legislative action to abolish capital punishment, the ACHR
Protocol abolishes the death penalty directly: “the States Parties to this Protocol
shall not apply the death penalty in their territory to any person subject to their
jurisdiction.”36 The ACHR Protocol, like the Second Optional Protocol, allows
states to enter reservations with respect to capital punishment during wartime,
though it restricts its application to “extremely serious crimes of a military nature”
and “in accordance with international law” (Art. 2(1)). Thirteen states are parties to
the ACHR Protocol.37
The abolition movement in Europe has been even more far-reaching than that
of Latin America, at least in terms of the number of countries affected. Western
European countries were among the first to prohibit capital punishment.38 A
number of them, including Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway,
Denmark, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, were leading promoters of abolition in the UN
and sponsored (along with a number of Latin American states) many of the General
Assembly resolutions on the subject.39 International institutions in Europe reflected
the abolitionist commitments of a growing number of European states. For
instance, the COE’s European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the first
general international human rights treaty, defines capital punishment as an
exception to the right to life.40 By the 1980s, most member states of the COE had
abolished capital punishment in national law.
In order to bring the ECHR up to date with respect to European practice, the
COE prepared Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR, which twelve states signed in April
1983. Protocol No. 6 bans the death penalty directly: “The death penalty shall be
abolished. No-one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed.”41 Under
Protocol No. 6, however, states may retain capital punishment provisions for
wartime or imminent threat of war (Art. 2). In May 2002, the COE passed Protocol
No. 13 to the ECHR, which directly and completely abolishes the death penalty,
with no reservations or derogations permitted.42 As of May 2018, forty-four states
had ratified or acceded to Protocol No. 13 and one (Russia) had signed but not

35 See SCHABAS, supra note 19, at 350 53.
36 Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, art. 1, June
8, 1990, O.A.S.T.S. No. 73. (Dept. of Int. Legal Affairs 2006 ed.).
37 Signatories and Ratifications, Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish
the Death Penalty, June 8, 1990, O.A.S.T.S. No. 73. (Dept. of Int. Legal Affairs 2006 ed.).
38 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 13, 49.
39 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 26 27; See SCHABAS, supra note 19, at 156 67.
40 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, April 11, 1950,
C.E.T.S. No. 005, 213 U.N.T.S. 2889 (Council of Europe 2006 ed.).
41 Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, art. 1, April 28, 1983, C.E.T.S. No. 114, 2889 U.N.T.S.
1496.
42 See Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstances, art. 1–3, March 3, 2002,
C.E.T.S. No. 187, 2889 U.N.T.S. 2246 (Council of Europe 2006 ed.).

[2019]

LEGAL ORDERING OF THE DEATH PENALTY

137

ratified.43
The EU has similarly embraced death penalty abolition. Of course, all EU
states are also members of the COE, and are therefore potential parties to Protocol
No. 6 and Protocol No. 13. By 2000, all twenty-seven of the current EU member
states had ratified Protocol No. 6. That same year, the EU bodies with legislative
roles—the European Council, the European Parliament, and the Commission—all
approved a Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 2 of the Charter, titled “Right
to Life,” declares, “No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed.”44
The Charter was incorporated as Part II of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution
for Europe.45
Even prior to 2000, in June 1998, the EU decided to make abolition of the
death penalty an issue in its relations with other countries, with the objective of
working “towards universal abolition of the death penalty as a strongly held policy
view agreed by all member states.”46 The EU, in fact, has made démarches to a
number of countries, including Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, Malaysia, Sri
Lanka, Japan, Guinea, Botswana, and the United States, on specific death penalty
cases. The EU has issued numerous diplomatic communications to the United
States, both regarding the death penalty in general and with respect to specific cases.
For instance, in a May 2001 letter to the U.S. government, the EU declared that it
was “deeply concerned about the high number of executions in the United States,”
and it called on the government “to consider further steps towards the abolition of
the death penalty.”47 In December 2005, the EU announced its “deep regret that,
with the execution of Kenneth Lee Boyd by the State of North Carolina on 2
December 2005, the US ha[d] carried out its 1,000th execution since the
reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976.”48 Over the past several years, the EU
has also filed amicus curiae briefs at the U.S. Supreme Court in death penalty cases,
including Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), in which the Court determined that
the execution of juveniles violated the U.S. Constitution. Several U.S. states have
also been the recipients of EU communications.49 Considering that the United
States continues to employ the death penalty, it may appear that the influence of

43 See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications to Treaty 187, Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death
Penalty in All Circumstances, March 3, 2002, C.E.T.S. No. 187, 2889 U.N.T.S. 2246 (Council of Europe
2018 ed.).
44 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364).
45 See Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Part II, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 301) 47.
46 European Union, Guidelines to EU Policy Towards Third Countries on the Death Penalty, 29 June
1998, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/4705f3d12.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2019).
47 Press Release, European Union, EU Policy on the Death Penalty (May 10, 2001) (on file with author).
48 Council of the European Union Press Release 15262/05 (Presse 341), Declaration by the Presidency
on Behalf of the European Union on the 1,000th Execution in the US (Dec. 2, 2005).
49 For a compilation of EU death penalty actions vis-á-vis the United States and specific U.S. states, see
EU Policy & Action on the Death Penalty: Actions on US Death Row Cases, European Union Delegation of the European Commission to the USA (2006), https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/
united-states-america/35027/death-penalty-archive_en.
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European institutions is rather limited. However, the COE and the EU have played
a central role in promoting abolition in other countries.
To illuminate the influence of regional institutions, we take a closer look at
how the COE and the EU actively promoted abolition in the newly independent
states of Central and Eastern Europe. The COE and the EU exercised considerable
influence because the transition states were eager to consolidate their fledgling
democracies and market economies by joining these key European institutions.
With respect to the COE, some newly independent states abolished the death
penalty before joining; it is difficult to assess the extent to which anticipation of
COE membership figured among the motivations for abolition. In other cases, the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) played an active role in
pushing for abolition. PACE did not make death penalty abolition an explicit
requirement for the early applicants, like Hungary in 1990 or Estonia and Lithuania
in 1993. It did, however, attach “great importance to the commitment expressed by
the Lithuanian authorities to sign and ratify the European Convention on Human
Rights.” The opinion on the Estonian application contained similar language.50
By the mid-1990s, the COE had made signature and ratification of Protocol
No. 6 to the ECHR a condition of joining.51 Thus, PACE opinion on Latvia’s
application for membership declared that Latvia had committed itself to ratifying
the ECHR and Protocol No. 6 within a year of accession.52 The Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Armenia, Georgia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
also agreed to one-year time frames for ratifying Protocol No. 6.53 The agreements
with Moldova, Albania, Ukraine, Croatia, and Russia required ratification of
Protocol No. 6 within three years of joining the COE.54 Some COE accession
agreements obligated new members to establish an immediate moratorium on
executions (Albania, Russia, Ukraine) or to pass legislation abolishing the death
penalty in domestic criminal codes within one year (Armenia).
In a few cases, when new members failed to fulfill their obligations related to
abolition of capital punishment, PACE increased the pressure for them to comply.
50 Eur. Parl. Ass., Report on the Application of the Republic of Lithuania for Membership of the Council of Europe,
Op. No. 168 (1993); Eur. Constul., Ass., Report on the application of the Republic of Estonia for Membership of
the Council of Europe, Op. No. 170 (1993).
51 See Eur. Parl. Ass., Abolition of the Death Penalty in Europe ¶6, Res. 1097 (1996); Eur. Parl., Ass., Abolition
of Capital Punishment ¶6, Res. 1044 (1994).
52 See Eur. Parl. Ass., Report on the Application by Latvia for Membership of the Council of Europe, Op. No. 183
(1995).
53 See Eur. Parl. Ass., The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Application for Membership of the Council of Europe,
Op. No. 239 (2002); Eur. Parl. Ass., Armenia’s Application for Membership of the Council of Europe, Op. No.
221 (2000); Eur. Parl. Ass., Georgia’s Application for Membership of the Council of Europe, Op. No. 209
(1999);Eur. Parl. Ass., Application by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for Membership of the Council of
Europe, Op. No. 191 (1995).
54 See Eur. Parl. Ass., Croatia’s Request for Membership of the Council of Europe, Op. No. 195 (1996);Eur.
Parl. Ass., Russia’s Request for Membership of the Council of Europe, Op. No. 193 (1996); Eur. Parl. Ass.,
Application by Albania for Membership of the Council of Europe, Op. No. 189 (1995); Eur. Parl. Ass., Application
by Moldova for Membership of the Council of Europe, Op. No. 188 (1995); Eur. Parl. Ass., Application by Ukraine
for Membership of the Council of Europe, Op. No. 190 (1995).
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For instance, Armenia faced strong criticism from PACE in 2002 for having failed
to ratify Protocol No. 6 and having failed to abolish the death penalty in its criminal
code, contrary to commitments made at accession.55 By September 2003, Armenia
had both ratified Protocol No. 6 and eliminated capital punishment from its
domestic statutes.56 In other cases, COE pressure did not induce countries to
abolish. For instance, after a number of executions in Belarus in the late 1990s,
PACE suspended the country’s status as a Special Guest and froze its accession
process. PACE urged Belarus “to declare an immediate moratorium on executions
and set in motion the legislative procedure for the abolition of capital
punishment.”57
Similarly, following executions in Ukraine in 1996, PACE threatened to
withhold recognition of the “credentials of the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation
at its next session.”58 The following year, after more executions, PACE decided to
“reconsider” the credentials of the Ukrainian delegation, pending notice of a
moratorium on executions.59 A de facto moratorium followed, but PACE continued
to condemn Ukraine for failing to honor its accession commitment to ratify
Protocol No. 6 and abolish capital punishment de jure.60 In 1997, PACE also
criticized Russia for failing to honor its commitment to institute a moratorium on
executions, and has since repeatedly pressured Russia to ratify Protocol No. 6. In a
2005 resolution, PACE reminded Russia that the deadline for ratifying the death
penalty protocol had passed in 1999, and that other countries had been exposed to
sanctions for failing to meet the same commitment.61
In general, the COE requirement has been effective in spreading abolition to
the former communist countries. By 2002, “16 East European countries had
abolished capital punishment and ratified the Sixth Optional Protocol to the ECHR,
and three had signed it”—all had been retentionist up to the end of Communist rule
in 1989.62
The EU has similarly promoted abolition through its enlargement process.63
55 See Eur. Parl. Ass., Armenia’s Application for Membership of the Council of Europe, Op. No. 221 (2000).
56 See Human Rights Section of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, The Death Penalty in the OSCE Area, Background
Paper 2003/1 (2003).
57 Eur. Parl. Ass., Situation in Belarus, Rec. 1441 (2000).
58 Eur. Parl. Ass., Honouring of the Commitment Entered into by Ukraine upon Accession to the Council of Europe
to Put into Place a Moratorium on Executions, Res. 1112 (1997).
59 Eur. Parl. Ass., Executions in Ukraine, Res. 1145 (1998).
60 See Eur. Parl. Ass., Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Ukraine, Res. 1179 (1999); Eur. Parl.
Ass, Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Ukraine, Rec. 1416 (1999).
61 See Eur. Parl. Ass., Russia Must ‘Show Determination’ and Abolish the Death Penalty in Law (2006); Eur.
Parl. Ass., Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by the Russian Federation, Res. 1455 (2005); Eur. Parl.
Ass., Honouring of the Commitment Entered into by Russia upon Accession to the Council of Europe to Put into Place
a Moratorium on Executions, Res. 1111 (1997).
62HOOD, supra note 30, at 17.
63 “Enlargement process” refers to the mechanism for and conditions under which states may join the
European Union. Any European country is able to apply for membership so long as it meets all the of
the membership criteria.
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By the early 1990s, as the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe
began to apply for EU membership, all of the existing fifteen EU member states
had ratified Protocol No. 6 except Belgium, Greece, and the United Kingdom, and
these three would ratify by 1999. The European Council established in 1993 the
“Copenhagen Criteria,” political, economic, and legislative conditions that applicant
states would have to meet before accession. The political criteria included
“democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of
minorities.”64 The European Commission translated those general ideals into
detailed series of specific standards, which it published in “Enlargement Strategy”
papers. With respect to the death penalty, the Commission’s initial “opinions”
reported on the status of capital punishment in each applicant country. For instance,
the response to Bulgaria’s application noted that “the death penalty has not been
abolished in Bulgaria, but since 1990 it has been subject to a moratorium decreed
by the President of the Republic.”65 The initial report on Estonia noted that capital
punishment had not been abolished, but that “[t]he President of the Republic has
declared a moratorium on the application of the death penalty and the Minister of
Justice has undertaken to abolish it before February 1, 1998.”66
Succeeding annual reports on each applicant country monitored the status of
the death penalty and ratification of Protocol No. 6. So, for instance, the 1999 report
on Poland noted that Protocol No. 6 had not yet been ratified.67 In its overall
reports, the Commission included tables on the ratification of human rights treaties
by all of the candidate countries. The June 1999 report showed that of the ten
applicant states, only Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Poland had not yet ratified ECHR
Protocol No. 6.68 But by the 2001 report, all had ratified,69 and in 2005, all ten
candidate states became EU members. The death penalty criterion applied to the
2007 entrants (Bulgaria and Romania) as well, and will apply in any subsequent
enlargements.
In short, European institutions have played an active role in pushing new
democracies in Eastern and Central Europe toward abolition of the death penalty.
The lure of the Council of Europe and the European Union was so great that postSoviet, democratizing countries were willing to give up capital punishment in order
to gain the political and economic benefits of membership in Europe’s core
institutions.

64 Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council (June 21–22, 1993).
65 European Comm’nCommission Opinion on Bulgaria’s Application for Membership of the European Union,
Doc. 97/11 (July 15, 1997).
66 European Comm’n, Agenda 2000: Opinion of the Comm’n on Estonia’s Application for Membership of the
European Union, DOC 97/12 (July 15, 1997).
67 See European Comm’n, Regular Report from the Comm’n on Poland’s Progress Towards Accession 11 (1998).
68 See European Comm’n, Composite Paper: Reps. on Progress Towards Accession by Each of the Candidate
Countries, annex 3, 49 (1999).
69 See European Comm’n, Making a Success of Enlargement: Strategy Paper and Rep. of the European Comm’n
on the Progress Towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries (2001).
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C. Transnational Actors
Efforts to craft international and regional legal instruments abolishing the
death penalty began in intergovernmental fora immediately after World War II and
continue to the present. The effort to ban capital punishment thus predates the
emergence of transnational human rights NGOs and the expansion of their
influence. The most prominent international human rights NGOs, Amnesty
International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), have become consistent and
vocal advocates of death penalty abolition. AI, founded in 1961, has made death
penalty abolition one of its high-priority issue areas. AI’s concern with executions
arose in connection with its primary initial mission on behalf of political prisoners.
The organization subsequently came to oppose capital punishment in general, and,
in 1971, called for its universal abolition. AI launched a global anti-death penalty
campaign in 1989; since then it has monitored and reported on the status of capital
punishment around the world and has pushed for abolition.70 HRW was founded
in 1978 as Helsinki Watch; in 1988, it joined with the other regional “Watch
Committees” to form the current global organization.71 HRW focuses its attention
on the death penalty in specific countries rather than on a general campaign for
abolition. It publicizes and condemns executions, and it reports on the status of
capital punishment in specific countries in its annual World Report.72
HRW and AI both began to campaign actively for death penalty abolition in
the 1980s, just before the burst of abolition in national law after 1990. The NGOs
did not cause that surge, however. The collapse of the Soviet Union,
democratization in the successor states, and the subsequent inclusion of former
Soviet states and satellites in the main European institutions—the EU and the
Council of Europe—were clearly the key proximate causes. We argue that the
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) added political and
normative force to the abolitionist movement. Researchers in the world society
tradition73 have shown in a variety of substantive contexts that INGOs are effective
carriers of international norms and institutional forms into national contexts.74 With
70 See Amnesty Int’l, Death Sentences and Executions: 2017, AI Index ACT 50/7955/2018 (2018).
71 History, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ( Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/history.
72 The most recent World Report is available at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019 (Feb. 4, 2019).
73 World Society theory focuses on transnational interaction and global social change and explores the
importance of international institutions and culture in shaping the behavior of individuals,
organizations, and states. Researchers of the world society tradition do not necessarily see individual
states or the international system as predominant and the unit of analysis, but rather the global
population, which is based upon and organized around common values and goals. As a result, INGOs
play a key role as carriers of ideas, morals, and values.
74 See, e.g. Wade M. Cole, Hard and Soft Commitments to Human Rights Treaties,1966–2000, 24 SOC. F. 563
(2009); Christine Min Wotipka & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Global Human Rights and State Sovereignty: State
Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1965–2001, 23 SOC. F. 724 (2008); Kiyoteru Tsutsui &
Christine Min Wotipka, Global Civil Society and the International Human Rights Movement: Citizen Participation
in Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations, 83 SOC. FORCES 587 (2004); John W. Meyer
et al., World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. OF SOC. 144 (1997); John Boli, Human Rights or State
Expansion? Cross-National Definitions of Constitutional Rights, 1870-1970, in INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
(George Thomas, et al. eds., 1987); John Boli-Bennett & John Meyer, The Ideology of Childhood and the
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respect to death penalty abolition, Kim argues:
[H]uman rights INGOs can empower pro-abolition constituencies and
influence governments’ calculations and deliberations toward abolition.
Specifically, they do so by framing capital punishment as a human rights
violation through abolitionist campaigns and lobbying parliamentarians to
repeal death penalty laws. Through their anti-death penalty activism,
human rights INGOs tip the domestic political balance between pro- and
anti-death penalty constituencies in favor of complete abolition.75
Kim’s empirical analysis demonstrates a strong link between the presence of
human rights INGOs in a country and the likelihood that the country abolishes the
death penalty for all crimes.76
We offer a similar argument and find support for it using a new method for
gauging INGO influence. As a first cut, we present a descriptive picture of the scale
of INGO death penalty activism. Instead of measuring the number of human rights
INGOs present in a country, we assessed the documents (world reports, country
reports) produced by AI and HRW. We classified the documents as to whether they
address a specific country or are global in coverage. Using textual analysis tools, we
counted the number of occurrences in each document of three key phrases: “death
penalty,” “death sentence,” and “capital punishment,” coding each such reference
as a “hit.”77 The number of documents addressing a specific country in any given
year is small, usually one or two. For specific countries, we therefore use the number
of “hits” (death penalty references) in country-specific documents in a given year as
a measure of INGO activity regarding the death penalty within that country. We
likewise counted the number of general INGO documents (not country-specific)
that include the death penalty phrases. The number of years covered for the two
organizations differs because AI was created fifteen years before HRW. Figure 5
depicts the total number of documents, both general and country-specific, referring
to the death penalty. It shows that the highest occurrences of death penalty phrases
are reached during the 1990s and after 2000. The following figure (Figure 6) shows
the number of hits in all INGO documents; these also peak at nearly one thousand
hits per year after the year 2000. Clearly, death penalty abolition was the subject of
vigorous INGO campaigning during the key period (during the 1990s and after
2000).

State: Rules Distinguishing Children in National Constitutions, 1870–1970, 43 AM. SOC. REV. 797 (1978).
75 Dongwook Kim, International Non-governmental Organizations and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 22
EUR. J. OF INT’L REL. 596 (2016).
76 See id.
77 The term “execution” and its stem (“execut”) could not be used because they collected too many
unrelated terms related to, for example, the executive branch, an executive summary, and so on.
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III. DATA AND ANALYSIS
The analysis now focuses on abolition of the death penalty in national law.
Because penal law and the carrying out of punishments is a matter of domestic law
and practice, the settling of a death penalty TLO must be visible at the national
level. We therefore model the most comprehensive form of abolition (for all crimes)
in domestic law. We utilize a technique—Cox proportional hazard models—that
allows us to estimate the extent to which various domestic and international factors
affect (a) the likelihood that a country will abolish the death penalty and, if it does,
(b) how long it takes to do so. The period covered by our analyses begins in 1960
and ends in 2012;78 the models include at least 150 countries.79
Our central puzzle is that death penalty abolition virtually always occurs
despite majority public support for retention. As Hood and Hoyle put it, “[W]here
abolition has come about it has not been as a result of the majority of the general
public supporting it.”80 Indeed, abolition has generally occurred despite public
opposition. As Gottschalk et al. put it, “Leading European countries abolished the
death penalty [after World War II] in the face of strong, sometimes overwhelming,
public support for its retention.”81 This was the case in Germany (abolished 1949),
the United Kingdom (abolished 1969), France (1981), as well as Canada (1998).82
As we report in our brief case study of Lithuania, abolition there followed the same
pattern.83 The absence of comprehensive cross-national public opinion data makes
it impossible to demonstrate conclusively that no state has ever abolished the death
penalty at a time when the public supported such a change. However, in our review
of country studies, we have yet to find an instance of supportive public opinion at
the time of abolition.
The TLO framework posits constant recursivity, that is, influences flowing in
both directions across levels (national and international) and between law and
practices.84 Thus, changes in law can affect attitudes and beliefs. There is evidence
of that effect in death penalty abolition. To be sure, in some countries that have
already abolished, public majorities favor reintroduction of capital punishment;
examples include Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Peru, South Africa, the Czech
Republic, and Poland.85 But public support for the death penalty sometimes declines

78 The analysis loses little by not starting before 1960 as only two countries (Honduras and the Federal
Republic of Germany) abolished the death penalty for all crimes between 1945 and 1959. Data for some
key variables are not available for years prior to 1960.
79 The main models (1–4) include between 154 to 160 countries. Models 5–8, in which we include
variables such as ethnic war, ethnic violence, civil war, and extrajudicial killings, cover 136 to 144
countries due to the lack of data for these variables.
80 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 350.
81 MARIE GOTTSCHALK, et al., THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 227 (2006).
82 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 352.
83 See infra Part IV pp, 253–54.
84 See Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 4.
85 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 374–76.
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after its abolition. Over time, people come to see capital punishment as outmoded.86
In some countries, including in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Australia,
and New Zealand, where public opinion supported retention of capital punishment
pre-abolition, that support declined steadily—and dramatically—post-abolition.87
In many, perhaps most, countries (including some that have already
abolished), capital punishment is regarded as not just appropriate for certain crimes
but as necessary for upholding social morality and values. We therefore theorize
that there are certain institutional arrangements under which it is possible for a
polity to overcome majoritarian opposition to abolition. We suggest two such
mechanisms, one legislative and one judicial.
1. Proportional Representation (PR). Some democratic electoral systems will be
more favorable to abolition than others. In parliamentary systems with at least some
PR (seats allocated to parties according to their overall share of the vote), political
parties are less constrained by the median voter (who tends to be retentionist)
because they can negotiate policy tradeoffs in the legislature with less fear of broader
electoral punishment. PR tends to produce multiparty governments, in which some
parties might represent voters who favor abolition and other parties might see
abolition as a low-priority issue for their supporters or who would be willing to trade
support for abolition for concessions on other issues. In other words, PR offers
more space for log-rolling and issue tradeoffs.88 We therefore include a variable that
captures whether states have at least some level of proportional representation in
the legislature.
Given our argument that publics are generally retentionist, we must anticipate
that democratic institutions play an ambiguous role. The more faithfully
democratically elected legislatures follow the majority preferences of the public, the
less likely they are to enact laws abolishing the death penalty. We therefore also
include a variable measuring the quality of democracy in states, but we expect it to
be either insignificant or to demonstrate a negative association with the likelihood
of abolition.
2. Judicial Independence. Courts are non-majoritarian institutions. Though courts
are necessarily strategic and pay attention to the other branches of government and
broader social developments, they are less constrained by mass public opinion or
the median voter. Apex courts can find that the death penalty is incompatible with
a country’s constitution or with its international obligations (for instance, the
ECHR). Indeed, the judicial mechanism can operate in tandem with the legislative
one. For example, a parliament that is eager to join the COE might refer the
question of the constitutionality of the death penalty to a constitutional court,
hoping for a ruling of unconstitutionality. As we will show, abolition in Lithuania
86 See id., at 376.
87 See id., at 376–77.
88 See Anthony McGann & Wayne Sandholtz, Patterns of Death Penalty Abolition, 1960–2005: Domestic and
International Factors, 56 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 275 (2012); ANDREW HAMMEL,
ENDING THE DEATH PENALTY: THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2010).
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followed this path. We therefore include in the models a variable that measures the
degree of judicial independence in states, on the hypothesis that courts that are more
independent from the political branches will be more capable of ruling the death
penalty impermissible.
In addition to PR and Judicial Independence, we also argue that transnational
influences can affect public and elite opinion regarding the death penalty. The two
major sources of transnational influence are INGOs and regional organizations,
both of which operate through persuasion, socialization and material incentives.
3. INGO Influence. We include two measures of the effects of INGO pressure
and persuasion on national abolition. One is a count of the number of occurrences
of death penalty phrases in INGO documents regarding a specific country in a given
year. This is a measure of the attention INGOs have devoted to the death penalty
for that state. The second measure counts the global number of death penalty
references in INGO documents, both country-specific texts and general texts, in a
given year. Of course, INGOs engage in a variety of other activities, including direct
lobbying of elected officials, filing amicus briefs in a country’s courts, supporting
local abolitionist organizations and campaigns, and providing technical assistance
to governments and civil society actors contemplating constitutional revision,
legislation, or litigation. Our INGO document variables are meant to capture, in
broad terms, the overall level of INGO attention to death penalty issues, thus
serving as indicators of their persuasive and socialization effects. The higher the
value on either INGO measure, the more likely a state is to abolish.
4. Regional Organization Incentives. The regional ordering of the death penalty in
the key European institutions (described above) has been decisive for many states
that gained independence after 1990. A variable that directly measures this
phenomenon is difficult to implement because, in the case of the COE, membership
in the organization is virtually coterminous with death penalty abolition. A series of
regional dummies roughly capture this effect.
Finally, we include variables to capture the influence of additional factors that
could affect a country’s likelihood of abolishing.
• Post-election year. Because abolition generally requires counter-majoritarian
policy-making, governments may be more likely to abolish when their
political support is presumably highest, namely, right after an election.
The first year after an election is also generally farther in time from the
next election, meaning that governments have time to rebuild any support
they might lose as a result of abolitionist legislation. We include a variable
that indicates the year after a national election in democratic countries
(since elections in autocratic states have little meaning).
• Prior steps toward abolition. Many countries approach abolition in steps. In
order to capture a country’s previous movement toward complete
abolition, we include a variable that indicates whether that state had
previously abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes. Prior progress
toward abolition should make complete abolition more likely.

[2019]

LEGAL ORDERING OF THE DEATH PENALTY

147

• Country size. Larger countries (measured either in terms of population or total
GDP) may be less likely to abolish, given that the challenges of social
control could be larger.
• Religion. Prior research has shown that dominant religions can influence a
country’s likelihood of abolishing.89 We include variables for the
percentage of the population adhering to Protestant Christianity,
Catholicism, and Islam. In light of the Catholic church’s official
condemnation of the death penalty, strongly Catholic countries may be
more likely to abolish.
• Ethnic fragmentation and conflict. Governments may be more inclined to retain
the death penalty in countries with politically volatile ethnic divisions. The
death penalty is often a tool of repression, which can be used to intimidate
or eliminate leaders of rival ethnic groups. We include variables capturing
the degree of ethnic fractionalization, the level of ethnic violence, and the
presence of interethnic armed conflict.
• Repression. Governments that engage in political repression may be more
inclined to retain the death penalty as a potent tool. We include a measure
of states’ use of extrajudicial killing, which could be operated in two ways.
Extrajudicial killing could be a complement of capital punishment
(governments that make use of one also employ the other) or a substitute
(repressive governments might use extrajudicial killings so as not to be
seen executing opponents).
• Civil War. We also include an indicator of the existence of civil war, which
could also motivate governments to keep the death penalty as an
instrument for suppressing rebels or rival political formations.
Some additional variables that might seem logical candidates for inclusion
cannot be included. One would be data on homicide rates, on the supposition that
high levels of violent crime might increase elite commitment to the death penalty as
a tool for punishing and deterring crime. Unfortunately, reliable cross-national data
on homicide rates do not exist for even a single-year cross section, much less for an
analysis covering fifty-three years. Every existing source of national homicide data
depends on national reporting, which varies so wildly in quality, reliability, and
coverage that no cross-national analysis is possible. The best single source of
homicide data is the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which
has compiled data on national homicide counts and rates since 2003. But even the
UNODC warns, “Data supplied by countries may not exactly reflect the definition
[of intentional homicide] provided by UNODC,” and “When using the figures, any
cross-national comparison should be conducted with caution because of the
differences that exist between the legal definitions of offences in countries, the
different methods of offence counting and recording and differences in the share
of criminal offences that are not reported to or detected by law enforcement
89 See McGann & Sandholtz, supra note 87.
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authorities.”90 There is, nevertheless, some research on the relationship between
homicide rates and death penalty abolition. One study involving fifty-one countries
found no bivariate correlation between homicide rates and either support for the
death penalty in public opinion or retention of capital punishment.91 A second study
assessed 140 countries and found no significant relationship between homicide rates
and the likelihood of a country abolishing the death penalty.92 A third study, utilizing
multiple sources of homicide data, found the same thing: no relationship.93 Each of
these three studies was cross-sectional (analyzing a single year and the current
abolition status of countries), making it impossible to model the abolition choice as
we do. Given the data inadequacies and the evidence that homicide rates do not
correlate with abolition, we have no reservations in omitting such a variable from
the models.
A second potentially plausible but unusable variable is imprisonment rates.
Again, reliable cross-national data with sufficient time coverage are simply not
available. In one study, imprisonment rates are shown to be positively associated
with death penalty retention—but in only half of the models.94 The problem is that
using data for a single year, and analyzing whether countries have abolished or not
(as opposed to analyzing the decision to abolish), it is difficult to reach any
conclusion about the relationship between imprisonment rates and death penalty
abolition. On the one hand, high imprisonment rates might be associated with
countries that have abolished if the lack of executions means more people in prison.
On the other hand, low imprisonment rates might be associated with countries that
have abolished if they are an indicator of a less punitive criminal justice system. Due
to the lack of data reliability and coverage, we do not include a measurement for
imprisonment rates.
Figure 7 presents the results of the main regression (Model 1 in the Appendix,
reestimated with standardized variables). It depicts the estimated effect, with 95
percent confidence intervals, of each variable on the likelihood that a country will
abolish the death penalty for all crimes. Estimates to the left of the zero-line
decrease the likelihood of abolition; markers to the right of zero mean that the
variable increases the likelihood of abolition. If the confidence interval lines overlap
zero, we cannot be confident that the effect of the variable is not due to chance (it
is not significant at the conventional five percent level). In addition, because the
graph represents standardized coefficients (for the nonbinary variables), we can
compare the relative size of the effects of the variables.
90 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, HOMICIDE COUNTS AND RATES (2000–2015)
(2018) (on file with author).
91 See Peter J. van Koppen et al., Public Reasons for Abolition and Retention of the Death Penalty, 12 INT’L
CRIM. J. REV. 77, 86 (2002).
92 See Rick Ruddell & Martin G. Urbina, Minority Threat and Punishment: A Cross-National Analysis, 21
JUST. Q. 904, 923 (2004).
93 See David F. Greenberg & Valerie West, Siting the Death Penalty Internationally, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
295, 320 (2008).
94 See id., at 318.
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Figure 7

We were particularly interested in (1) institutional arrangements that could
make non-majoritarian policy-making more likely, and (2) transnational influences.
A few findings stand out. First, the analysis shows that proportional representation
has the expected effect of making abolition more likely; this is consistent with our
argument that PR institutions make log-rolling and policy tradeoffs more feasible,
even in contexts in which a majority of the public might favor retention of the death
penalty. We also argued that independent courts would be more likely to rule the
death penalty incompatible with constitutional law or treaty obligations. The
analysis also shows that judicial independence is associated with an increased
likelihood of abolition, but that it is significant in only some of the models.95
Country-specific INGO attention clearly has the hypothesized effect. Each increase
of one in the number of country-specific INGO hits increases the likelihood of
abolition by about twenty to twenty-five percent.96 Prior abolition for ordinary
crimes, not surprisingly, makes abolition for all crimes more likely. Finally, the
analysis illustrates that there is a strong, positive effect of Western Europe and
Eastern and Central European regions on the likelihood of abolition. We interpret
the effects of Western Europe and Eastern and Central European regions as rough
indicators of the influence of the main European organizations, the COE and the

95 See Table A in the Appendix.
96 See the full results reported in the Appendix.
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EU.97 Countries in Oceania and sub-Saharan Africa are also more likely to abolish.98
The variables representing the decades covered by this analysis control for the
possibility that the likelihood of abolishing varies from decade to decade, as a
product, for example, of broad international trends that affect many or most
countries. Confirming what we presented in Figures 1 and 2 above, the 1990s—
following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union—were a
period in which numerous countries ended capital punishment.
Some of the other findings are worth noting briefly (see the Appendix for
more complete results):
• Democracies are more likely to abolish the death penalty in the year after an
election, though the effect is not significant at the .10 level.
• In terms of religion, we expected that the larger the share of the population
that is Catholic, the higher the likelihood of abolishing; neither of the
other two religion variables (percent Protestant and percent Muslim) had
a significant effect.99
• Various measures of ethnic heterogeneity and conflict (ethnic fractionalization,
ethnic violence, and ethnic war) had no significant effect on abolition.
• We suggested that extrajudicial killing could be a complement of capital
punishment (repressive governments might use both) or a substitute
(repressive governments might use extrajudicial killings so as not to be
seen executing opponents). Neither intuition was supported by the
analysis because the coefficient failed to reach significance.
• Civil war likewise had no significant effect on abolition. Our interpretation
is that countries involved in civil wars do not appear to retain the death
penalty as a tool for eliminating rebels.
IV. CASE STUDIES
In the following brief case studies, we seek to illustrate the main arguments.
We selected two countries that fit the account of TLO development supported by
the data analysis (Lithuania and South Africa) and two countries that could be seen
as “off the regression line” and that did not abolish (Belarus and Japan).
Furthermore, we chose countries in different geographic regions in an effort to
diversify our case selection and trace the process of death penalty abolition in
different regional contexts. Finally, our case selection was also influenced by data
availability and the ability to draw from a variety of sources to cross-validate the
information. Our investigation into the cases aligns with the findings of our
97 The omitted region is the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), which has the lowest regional
rate of abolition. The hazard ratios for the regional variables reported in the appendix should be
interpreted as multiplying the likelihood of abolition as compared to MENA. Thus, in Model 1, countries
in Western Europe are nearly six times as likely as MENA countries to abolish the death penalty in any
given period.
98 See generally HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2 chs. 2 & 3 (discussing abolition trends in those regions).
99 See Appendix.
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quantitative analysis: democratic institutions, domestic and international NGO
activism, as well as regional institutions and incentives play key roles in the path to
abolition.
A. Lithuania
Lithuania displays several of the factors that we have argued make it possible
to abolish capital punishment despite majority public opinion in favor of retention.
Particularly crucial were democratization and the strong motivation to join the EU
and the COE. Lithuania also illustrates that courts offer a mechanism for
overcoming popular support for retention.
Lithuania made use of capital punishment during the Soviet era (1940–90) but
began to shift away from it after regaining independence in 1990. The new
constitution established a semi-presidential multi-party system, with the President
as the head of state and the Prime Minister as the head of government. Lithuania’s
democratic transition included judicial and penal reforms, and it was in that context
that the death penalty became a central issue.100 In the early 1990s, Lithuania revised
its Criminal Code to gradually limit the use of the death penalty.
Joining European institutions—the COE and eventually the EU—was also a
central element of Lithuania’s transition.101 Lithuania joined the COE and was
thereby exposed to European debates on the abolition of the death penalty. More
specifically, PACE criticized Lithuania and other Eastern European countries for
the use of the death penalty and subsequently urged them to end executions.102 In
response to the PACE’s recommendation, President Algirdas Brazauskas
announced a moratorium on capital punishment in July 1996 and sent a draft law
to the Lithuanian Parliament to suspend executions until the passage of a new
Criminal Code. Parliament never debated the proposal, finding it too
controversial.103 However, in 1997, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia revived efforts to
abolish the death penalty when they accepted a “Resolution on the Abolition of the
Death Penalty” during a session of the Baltic Assembly that urged states to sign
Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR.104 In response, the Lithuanian parliament prepared a
draft law abolishing the death penalty. However, again due to political and public
pressures, the law was not debated until 1998. Political leaders found abolition
unattractive in light of public support for retention. In fact, public opinion in the
1990s was “firmly in favour of the death penalty,” at the level of seventy to eighty
percent.105
100 See Aleksandros Dobryninas, The Experience of Lithuania’s Journey to Abolition, in CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: STRATEGIES FOR ABOLITION 236 (Peter Hodgkinson & William A. Schabas eds., 2004);
Peter Hodgkinson, Europe–A Death Penalty Free Zone: Commentary and Critique of Abolitionist Strategies, 26
OHIO N. U. L. REV. 625, 637 (2000).
101 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 64–65.
102 See Dobryninas, supra note 99, at 235–36.
103 See Dobryninas, supra note 99, at 236; see Hodgkinson, supra note 99, at 637.
104 See Dobryninas, supra note 99, at 235–36.
105 See id., at 236–37.
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In an effort to increase public awareness in Lithuania about capital punishment
and promote a pro-abolitionist viewpoint across society, human rights organizations
introduced various projects in 1996–99 to “show that the death penalty was
inhumane, inefficient and unjust and had no place in a contemporary criminal justice
system.”106 The COE helped to fund a public education project in Lithuania aimed
at shifting opinion toward abolition. Faced with the dilemma of overwhelming
constituent support for retention, but strongly desiring to join the EU, Lithuanian
legislators passed the matter to the Constitutional Court, in essence asking the Court
to take the abolitionist step for them.107 The Constitutional Court investigated the
compatibility of the death penalty with the Lithuanian Constitution and found it
unconstitutional in December 1998.108 Within weeks, the Lithuanian Parliament had
modified the criminal Code, and the following month, it ratified Protocol No. 6,
officially abolishing the death penalty for all crimes.
B. South Africa
South Africa also displays several of the factors that make abolition more
likely, including a democratic transition, international influences, and NGO
activism. The apartheid regime of South Africa relied heavily on death sentences
because this form of punishment was considered a means of controlling violent
crime and protecting the white minority from the majority African population.109
The apartheid government also cited public opinion as a source for retention.110
However, the political apartheid system started to crumble in the late 1980s, giving
way to constitutional change and social reforms, which would eventually amend and
halt cruel types of treatment of prisoners and punishment such as the death penalty.
Even before the abandonment of apartheid, domestic and international
pressure from states and non-state organizations fueled reforms and revitalized the
cause for abolition. For instance, the South African Youth Congress, a new antiapartheid organization, began to fight executions of anti-apartheid activists.111 The
Opposition Spokesman for Justice in Parliament also requested an investigation into
death penalty practice in 1988 and 1989. Furthermore, various organizations—the
Institute for Race Relations, the Association of Law Societies, the Society of
University Teachers of Law, the General Council of the Bar, the Medical
Association of South Africa, and especially Black Sash as well as Lawyers for Human
Rights—pressed the government to reopen the discussion on the death penalty.112
International pressure supported domestic calls for abolition. In 1986, AI
106 See id.
107 See Hodgkinson, supra note 99, at 637–38.
108 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 64–65.
109 See Peter Norbert Bouckaert, Shutting Down the Death Factory: The Abolition of Capital Punishment in
South Africa, 32 STAN. J. OF INT’L L. 292–93 (1996).
110 See PETER HODGKINSON & ANDREW RUTHERFORD, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: GLOBAL ISSUES
AND PROSPECTS 161 (1996).
111 See Bouckaert, supra note 108, at 296.
112 See id.
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announced a campaign to end human rights abuses in South Africa, calling attention
to the death penalty. AI also sent an open letter to President Botha condemning the
death penalty for political prisoners. U.N. General Assembly resolutions in 1986,
1987, and 1988 denounced apartheid and also opposed the death penalty and called
for a halt to executions.113
In February 1990, President F.W. De Klerk gave in to the increasing domestic
and international pressures and set the path to democratic reform.114 Such proposed
reforms included the unbanning of political parties, the release of Nelson Mandela,
as well as the revision of the death penalty legislation.115 The President also
announced a death penalty moratorium, stating that “no executions will take place
until Parliament has taken a final decision on the new proposals.”116 One year later,
President De Klerk’s proposals were adopted, greatly reducing the applicability of
the death penalty.117
Following democratic elections in 1994, an interim Constitution with a Bill of
Rights was introduced, which enhanced the power of the Constitutional Court.118
The new Minister of Justice saw the death penalty as contrary to the human rights
regime and a resumption of executions as undermining fundamental rights given by
the new 1994 constitution.119 In June 1995, the Constitutional Court decided
unanimously that the death penalty was unconstitutional.120 The judgment drew
attention to the international and regional abolition trend by stating that capital
punishment had been abolished “by almost half the countries of the world including
democracies of Europe and our neighboring countries Namibia, Mozambique and
Angola,” and by referring to AI reports to stress that capital punishment was
“seldom used” in retentionist countries.121 The court’s decision was endorsed by
the South African Parliament, and with the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1997,
all references to capital punishment were removed from South Africa’s statute
book.122

113Amnesty International Press Release and Open Letter to President Botha, African Activist Archive,
Michigan State University (1986), http://kora.matrix.msu.edu/files/50/304/32-130-229B-84AI%20Hawaii%203-12-86%20opt.pdf. ( last visited on on Oct.6, 2018); G.A. Res. A 41/35, Policies of
apartheid of the Government of South Africa, (Nov. 10, 1986); G.A. Res. A 42/23, Policies of apartheid
of the Government of South Africa, (Nov. 20, 1987); G.A. Res. A 43/50, Policies of apartheid of the
Government of South Africa, (Dec. 5, 1988).
114 F.W. De Klerk, State President of South Africa, Speech to Parliament (Feb. 2, 1990), as reprinted in
Bouckaert, supra note 108, at 297; See also HODGKINSON & RUTHERFORD, supra note 109, at 161.
115 See Bouckaert, supra note 108, at 297.
116 See id., at 296–97; Hodgkinson & Rutherford, at 161.
117 See Bouckaert, supra note 108, at 297.
118 See id., at 300–01.
119 See id., at 301.
120 See id., at 304; Hodgkinson & Rutherford, at 161.
121 S. v. Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at 685 (S. Afr.), as reprinted in Bouckaert, supra note 88,
at 306.
122 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 89.
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C. Belarus
Belarus is the only country in Europe that actively applies the death penalty,
though Criminal Code revisions in 1999 limited the scope and applicability of capital
punishment and thereby reduced the number of executions. While there were fortyseven executions in 1998, this number decreased to an average of two per year since
2008.123 The Belarussian government has claimed that the reason to retain the death
penalty is public support for it, pointing to a 1996 referendum where eighty-five
percent of the votes were in favor of retaining capital punishment. Unlike in
Lithuania and South Africa, where abolition passed despite public support, Belarus
still retains the death penalty on these grounds. However, Belarus also lacked several
of the factors that are associated with abolition: democratic government, robust
INGO activity, the incentive of membership in the EU and the COE, and
independent courts.
Belarus has been ruled autocratically since independence. It has lacked a
developed parliament, separation of powers, a real opposition that is able to
challenge the ruling parties loyal to President Lukashenko, and fair and secret
elections. The Venice Commission of the COE stated that Belarus’s constitution
was “illegal” and “[did] not respect minimum democratic standards and violates the
separation of powers and the rule of law.”124 Another major concern for European
institutions and INGOs is the lack of judicial independence and its effect on the
criminal justice system. AI and HRW have criticized the country’s judicial system,
pointing to unfair trials, no presumption of innocence, torture and ill-treatment of
prisoners, lack of confidential communications with lawyers, and lack of
independent investigations.125
We have also argued that INGOs can be carriers of anti-death penalty norms.
Though AI has criticized Belarus, NGOs are often unable to operate there
effectively and without government interference. For instance, Viasna, a leading
local human rights organization, was not allowed to register in 2003 even though
such a denial is a violation of the ICCPR.126 Unregistered organizations are not
allowed to receive or spend funding, and any activities carried out are punishable
with imprisonment. In 2011, Belarus refused to let AI, Viasna, and the Belarus
Helsinki Committee deliver to the president a petition in favor of abolition.127 While
INGOs such as AI and HRW have been reporting human rights abuses and have
campaigned against Belarus’ death penalty practices, they have also decried the lack
of public information on executions as hindering abolitionist efforts.
123 See VIKTORIA SERGEYEVA & ALLA POKRAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY AND ITS
ALTERNATIVE SANCTION IN EASTERN EUROPE: BELARUS, RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 8 (2012).
124 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT 99 (1998).
125 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ENDING EXECUTIONS IN EUROPE: TOWARDS ABOLITION OF THE
DEATH PENALTY IN BELARUS (2009), https://www.refworld.org/docid/49cb3e112.html; HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, “Belarus: Abolish the Death Penalty” (2012), https://www.hrw.org/news/
2012/03/19/belarus-abolish-death-penalty (last visited Oct. 24, 2018).
126 See SERGEYEVA & POKRAS, supra note 122, at 22.
127 See id., at 23.
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The absence of democratic, rule of law institutions bears directly on another
pro-abolition factor: European regional organizations. The COE and the EU made
democratization and respect for rights prerequisites for membership, creating
powerful incentives for newly independent states in Central and Eastern Europe to
(among other steps) abolish capital punishment. The Belorussian regime under
President Lukashenko has embraced a conservative Stalinist ideology and has
oriented itself away from Europe. A report issued by the European Parliament
described EU-Belarus relations as “hav[ing] always been difficult and hav[ing]
developed at a much slower pace” compared to other countries.128 Relations with
the EU remained strained throughout the 1990s and 2000s; in fact, the EU has
reduced “contacts between the EU and Belarus to below ministerial level and
terminated all technical assistance.”129 This outcome was mainly a result of Belarus’
continued reluctance to meet human rights standards by the continuation of the
death penalty. The EU underlined that “specific and irreversible steps of Belarus on
promotion of universal freedoms involving freedom of speech . . . as well as the
rule of law and human rights, [and] abolition of the death penalty would be the key point
to . . . further relations with the country.”130 The PACE agreed in 2009 to restore
Belarus’s guest status if the country introduced an official moratorium on
executions. This revived the debate and Belorussian officials expressed interest in
moving towards a moratorium due to both prospects of regaining COE guest status
as well as changes in public opinion increasingly supporting abolition. Belarus
acknowledged to the UN Human Rights Council the importance of shifting public
opinion on the death penalty and of eventually abolishing it. However, after the
disputed presidential elections of December 2010, President Lukashenko halted
progress toward abolition. The main argument for this development was the
terrorist attack on the Minsk subway in 2011; the two men responsible for the attack
were sentenced to death by the Supreme Court in 2011 and executed in 2012. The
latest human rights dialogue between Belarus and the EU occurred in July 2017 and
specifically addressed freedoms of expression, assembly, and association, as well as
electoral rights, and the death penalty.131
D. Japan
Besides the United States, Japan is now the only highly developed democratic
country that retains the death penalty in legal and practical terms.132 However,
compared to the US and other Asian countries, where executions have been
128 GISELLE BOSSE & ALENA VIEIRA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN BELARUS: THE EU’S ROLE SINCE 2016, at
8 (2018).
129 Id., at 18.
130 Id., at 21, (emphasis added).
131 Id., at 22.
132 See David T. Johnson, Progress and Problems in Japanese Capital Punishment, in CONFRONTING CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN ASIA: HUMAN RIGHTS, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC OPINION 168, 168 (Roger Hood &
Surya Deva eds., 2013); MAI SATO, THE DEATH PENALTY IN JAPAN: WILL THE PUBLIC TOLERATE
ABOLITION? 21 (2014).
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decreasing in recent years, Japan presents a unique case with its increasing numbers
in death penalty sentences and executions.133 Historically, except for a brief period
in the late 1980s, during which the country implemented a moratorium on capital
punishment for three years, Japan has been consistently retentionist since the end
of World War II.134 The Japanese government grounds the decision for maintaining
the death penalty in public support for retention. A government survey in 2009
found that eighty-six percent of participants favored retention.135 Interestingly,
death penalty practice in Japan takes place out of public view, leaving the public
with only “abstract ideas” about the legal and practical procedures of execution.136
Why has Japan not followed the path of most other wealthy democracies, abolishing
the death penalty despite retentionist public opinion? We argued that proportional
representation increases the likelihood of legislative bargains that include abolition.
Japan’s political system has prevented those kinds of coalitional log-rolling
agreements.
Though Japan has a multiparty system, the conservative Liberal Democratic
Party (LDC) has been the dominant ruling party since it was founded in 1955. Other
parties were largely irrelevant until the Democratic Party (DPJ) emerged in 1998.
After defeating the LDC in the 2009 general elections, the DPJ held power for three
years. While abolitionists expected this to be a potential breakthrough moment for
death penalty abolition, executions continued to be carried out during this time,
albeit at a decreased rate.137 With the LDC regaining power in 2013, executions have
again been increasing.138 Japan’s judiciary has also referenced the majority public
support for retention to justify continued application of death penalty sentences and
executions.139 Several Ministers of Justice referred directly or indirectly to the “duty
to order executions.”140 The Supreme Court has acknowledged the global trend of
abolition but has also referred to government surveys on public attitudes favoring
retention for its reluctance to challenge the constitutionality of the death penalty.141
As Sato notes, the court considers that abolishing the death penalty is a “‘legislative
policy decision’ rather than a judicial action.”142
In terms of domestic and international pressure, thus far Japan has successfully
resisted demands for abolition. Like in Belarus, NGOs do not have the ability to
operate at full effect and face a variety of regulations and restrictions in Japan. Local
NGOs often receive funding from the government and have been referred to as
133 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 112 ; Johnson, supra note 131, at 168.
134 See SATO , supra note 131, at 22.
135 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 113; SATO, supra note 131, at 25
136 Shigemitsu, Dando, Toward the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 72 Ind. L.J. 9, 10 (1996), quoted in SATO,
supra note 131, at 25.
137 See Johnson, supra note 131, at 170; SATO, supra note 131, at 22.
138 See SATO , supra note 131, at 22.
139 See Shanhe Jiang, et al., Death Penalty Views in China, Japan and the U.S.: An Empirical Comparison, 38
JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 863 (2010); SATO, supra note 131, at 23.
140 Johnson, supra note 131, at 171.
141 See SATO, supra note 131, at 24.
142 Id., quoting Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme [FIDH], 2003, p.10).
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“quasi-governmental organizations.”143 Further, human rights NGOs lack
consultation status and do not participate in the drafting of official human rights
reports in Japan. NGOs have access to these reports only after they are published
and they have to submit separate reports to international organizations.144 In terms
of INGO activity, AI has consistently criticized Japan’s retentionist position as well
as the questionable procedures surrounding the practice. The EU in 2001 threatened
to withdraw Japan’s observer status. Though Japan did not respond, the EU has yet
to follow through with this threat.145
CONCLUSION
In this conclusion, we return to questions posed in the introductory essay.
Framing. The death penalty TLO is not about enhancing the power of state
officials to combat transnational crime. The death penalty is situated at the
punishment end of the criminal justice spectrum, and thus the death penalty TLO
is about establishing limits to what the state can do to punish the guilty. Capital
punishment is framed by advocates and policy entrepreneurs as a global human
rights problem. In this sense, domestic processes of enforcement have “become
more enmeshed in transnational frameworks.”146 The post-World War II context
was propitious for advancing a human rights framing of the death penalty, in
reaction to the massive abuses of execution as a tool of political repression and
genocide. But the success of the human rights framing has been partial because
normative counter-narratives are available, even within the expanding international
human rights regime. The right to life is not absolute; taking human life is
permissible in war and in personal self-defense, for example. The right to life, in
some constructions, can be forfeited. Divergent national frameworks regarding
capital punishment could therefore be asserted and retained even while retentionist
states accept the broader international human rights system.
Settling. What inhibits settling of TLO norms? In the case of the death penalty,
transnational norms are neither ambiguous nor indeterminate: capital punishment
is framed as a violation of the most fundamental human right, the right to life.
Settling of this norm is incomplete because it is in direct collision with national or
local norms that see capital punishment as justified or even necessary to defend
social order or national security. The norm of abolition has settled in much of the
world but it remains contested, especially in some regions (Middle East and North
Africa, Asia).
Concordance. We observe considerable concordance at the regional and
domestic levels in some parts of the world (Europe, Oceania, and Latin America)
143 Frank Schwartz, Civil Society in Japan Reconsidered, 3 JAPANESE J. OF POL. SCI. 195, 203–04 (2002).
144 See IAN NEARY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, AND TAIWAN 66 (2002).
145 See MIKA OBARA-MINNITT, JAPANESE MORATORIUM ON THE DEATH PENALTY 110 (2016);
Roger Hood & Carolyn Hoyle, Abolishing the Death Penalty Worldwide: The Impact of a ‘New Dynamic,’ 38
CRIME AND JUST. 1, 29 (2009).
146 Ely Aaronson and Gregory Shaffer, conference framework paper on file.
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but with continuing gaps in others. The variation is mainly across countries and
regions.
State power. The death penalty TLO has not been driven by powerful states
seeking to impose their conceptions of criminal justice on others. In fact, several of
the most powerful states (the United States, China) remain among the leading
resisters to the TLO. At the international level, in the drafting of key instruments
like the UDHR, the ICCPR, and its Second Optional Protocol, the policy
entrepreneurs tended to represent small and midsized states, often from Latin
America and Western Europe.
Data power. Data and information on the death penalty have been collected and
disseminated largely by INGOs at the heart of transnational human rights networks:
AI and HRW. Even so, the ongoing dynamics of abolition and resistance are not
driven primarily by differing quantitative or qualitative assessments of capital
punishment, but rather by divergent underlying values.
The transnational legal ordering of capital punishment remains uneven, with
significant parts of the world remaining outside its reach. As shown above, countries
in the Middle East, North Africa, and much of Asia have largely retained the death
penalty. Moreover, some of the world’s largest countries continue not just to keep
the death penalty on the books but to carry it out: China (the world leader in
executions), the United States, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, and Nigeria. In
this light, the transnational legal ordering of the de3ath penalty may well have
reached a point at which its further extension is unlikely. In the current climate of
populist authoritarianism, some retreat may even be possible.
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APPENDIX
Table A
Abolition for all crimes, Cox proportional hazard models
1
2
3
4
Democracy
1.091
0.882
2.027
2.408
(1.057) (0.897) (2.184) (2.913)
Proportional
4.190*** 4.146*** 3.282*** 3.203***
representation
(1.546) (1.539) (1.199) (1.197)
Judicial independence
1.9
1.87
0.688
1.412
(1.650) (1.639) (0.725) (1.286)
INGO country1.208*** 1.209*** 1.252*** 1.215***
specific "hits"
(0.051) (0.052) (0.057) (0.059)
Prior abolition for
3.930*** 3.743*** 4.927*** 3.909***
ordinary crimes
(1.485) (1.385) (1.739) (1.562)
Population (ln)
0.809** 0.804** 0.747*** 0.807*
(0.084) (0.082) (0.076) (0.090)
1970s
2.314
2.314
2.364
0.715
(2.361) (2.357) (2.232) (0.520)
1980s
5.307
5.384
4.983
1.54
(5.653) (5.802) (5.335) (0.870)
1990s
18.884* 19.240* 19.699* 4.129**
(17.413) (17.877) (18.191) (2.326)
2000s
4.858
4.848
5.022
(4.937) (4.954) (4.984)
Western Europe
5.981*** 6.490*** 3.124 5.574***
(3.543) (3.892) (2.316) (3.471)
CEE & ex-USSR
6.903*** 7.317*** 4.100** 5.674***
(4.242) (4.507) (2.832) (3.526)
Oceania
10.839* 11.754* 6.266* 10.132**
(9.635) (10.337) (6.105) (8.919)
Latin America
1.369
1.438
0.352
1.353
(0.838) (0.896) (0.285) (0.863)
North America & the
3.421
3.463
1.614
1.702
Caribbean
(3.449) (3.515) (1.698) (1.954)
Sub-Saharan Africa
5.594*** 5.843*** 2.786* 4.993***
(2.689) (2.869) (1.662) (2.572)
Asia
2.748
2.815
2.008
2.516
(1.943) (2.019) (1.398) (1.836)
Year after election;
1.663
democracies only
(0.571)
Percent protestant
1.003
(0.009)
Percent Catholic
1.019***
(0.005)

5
0.336
(0.457)

6
0.246
(0.343)

7
0.404
(0.567)

8
0.514
(0.668)

4.095*** 4.357*** 3.696*** 2.430**
(1.857)
6.571*
(6.389)

(1.891) (1.728)
8.790** 7.039*
(9.024) (7.019)

(0.949)
3.064
(3.214)

1.241*** 1.249*** 1.242*** 1.187***
(0.075)

(0.079)

(0.075)

(0.062)

3.934*** 4.381*** 3.991*** 4.171***
(2.003)
0.825
(0.129)

(2.330)
0.852
(0.136)

(2.038)
0.817
(0.127)

(2.023)
0.962
(0.125)

1.099
(0.717)
6.860*** 6.529*** 6.346*** 3.877**
(4.139) (3.725) (3.788) (2.583)

7.607**
(6.444)
7.177***
(4.818)
0
0
1.379
(1.021)

5.914**
(5.250)
6.028***
(4.167)
0
0
1.218
(0.922)

7.321**
(6.391)
7.510***
(5.255)
0
0
1.39
(1.062)

6.513**
(4.758)
8.860***
(5.712)
5.528
(7.023)
1.61
(1.112)

0.919

0.666

0.814

1.408

(1.508)
4.964***
(2.538)
1.784
(1.568)

(1.153)
4.672***
(2.474)
1.829
(1.735)

(1.353)
4.630***
(2.505)
1.796
(1.609)

(1.938)
4.199***
(2.262)
2.134
(1.669)
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